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Part Two

Could you tell us a little about the Viterra acquisition, and how it happened?

It was a complicated transaction and at that time I had little experience in major M&A. Canada and therefore Viterra became a focus for us because the Canadian Wheat Boards monopoly rights were about to be rescinded by the government. We were also already a big trader of wheat, barley and canola and these were key exports from Canada so it was complimentary. We began by looking at the business as a whole, and we identified the businesses that we didn’t want. We presold the fertiliser production and distribution to Agrium and CF Industries. We presold a smaller piece of the fertilizer business and some of the grain handling assets to Richardson. If the transaction hadn’t gone through those sales would have been unwound.

We presold those businesses in part to help with financing the acquisition but also because we either didn’t want them or because we wanted to involve Canadian companies in the transaction. There wasn’t an anti-trust issue, as we didn’t already have a business in Canada, but we had to get approval as a foreign company taking over a strategic Canadian company. Pre-selling parts of the business to Canadian companies helped us enormously in getting Canadian government approval. 

We also sold off quite a number of businesses post the acquisition, like the pasta, malt business and the petroleum distribution business; we ended up keeping only about 50% of the company. The enterprise value of the total acquisition was $7.3 billion. At the time it was the biggest acquisition in our space—and still is.

The deal was finalised in Toronto. The Viterra people were in a building and I was in a restaurant with the rest of the deal team just over the road. At one stage there was a long silence and we thought we had lost it to ADM. There was a bit of toing and froing during which I was on the phone with Ivan Glasenberg, Agrium and Richardson deciding whether we should pay more, and how much more. That was one of the beauties of working for Glencore and particularly with Ivan whom I reported to directly. For such a large company there was almost no bureaucracy. You could make big decisions incredibly quickly and easily. It was a huge advantage.

Glencore is somewhat more structured now than it used to be, but to some extent it has to be given the growth of the business post the merger with Xstrata. It is still the same people though. And the company is people. It is only as good as the people that run it.

Why did you keep the Viterra name?

In Canada Viterra had a long history and a well-respected name, appreciated by the farming community, so we had no reason to change it. In Australia, Viterra itself had only bought the business three or four years earlier. Glencore already had a sizable trading business in Australia, headquartered in Melbourne. The Viterra business was headquartered in Adelaide and it was a separate non-trading business providing handling services to third parties as well as to Glencore, so it made some sense to keep the two separate.

Glencore Ltd has transformed itself from a trading company into a mining and trading company. Is Glencore Ag planning any similar transformation, or did the Viterra acquisition already do that?

I think we have largely already done that. Something like 80 percent of our earnings now comes from non-trading. But the asset businesses of Glencore Ag are quite different from the mining businesses of Glencore PLC. Even where we have a dense set of assets such as in Canada—65 country elevators and 5 port facilities—we are buying from the farmer and selling to customers around the world; nothing is entirely back-to-back. So these are asset-based businesses with strong elements of trading running through them. As I said this type of business now constitutes 80 percent of Cargill Ag’s earnings. 

You mean Glencore Ags?

(Laughs) Yes, sorry. You know I still sometimes answer the phone “Cargill!”

Trading has become more difficult for reasons that are well known to everyone. This will not change. The transformation to an asset based company, both in Glencore as a whole and Glencore Ag bought Glencore PLC to where it is today with an annual EBITDA of $14-15 billion. This would obviously be quite impossible as a trading company. Already in the early 2000s we could see that pure trading was going to become increasingly challenging.

Other trading houses are moving both ways along the supply chain. Cargill has moved into proteins; ADM and LDC into ingredients. Is Glencore Ag planning to do something similar?

No. I think that is very difficult to do. If you are Cargill and you started to do that forty or fifty years ago, as they did, then that was the right move. They can continue in that same direction. It is a natural progression. For us to transform ourselves now from an upstream procurement, handling, oilseed-crushing company into a company that captures the full value chain—that includes refining, bottling, milling, branding, ingredients, feed—is very difficult.

I say that for a simple reason: we originate about 80 mln tonnes per year and it is much easier to capture those big flows upstream as you are dealing with fewer origins. For example, Russia exports 40 million tonnes of wheat each year through five or six port facilities. Argentina supplies almost 50 percent of the world’s soybean meal through just a few export corridors. You can capture big flows in relatively few countries moving through big facilities. The business is much more fragmented on the consumption end. Egypt, the world’s biggest buyer of wheat, imports ten or eleven million tonnes and there are multiple importers and in turn numerous millers. 

One of the mantras that you hear in our business is that you have to capture the full value chain. We can’t possibly do that now. It would cost billions to build downstream businesses of a tonnage that was even remotely relevant to the tonnage that we secure upstream. That is not viable from where we are today. Instead we have to look at improving the core business by deploying capital in the right places.

What do your Canadian shareholders add to your business—and do you think that at some stage Glencore Ag will spin off as a private company?

Glencore Ag is already a separate company owned 50 percent by Glencore and 50 percent by our two Canadian shareholders. They add financial muscle. They are in for the long term. They bring certain insights and observations as an outsider in terms of analytics, finance and a global investment perspective that is valuable. 

Are you still looking at mergers and acquisitions?

I still very much believe that the industry requires consolidation through mergers or acquisitions. Moving downstream is not tackling the problem. What I believe we need to do is stick to our core business, focus on developing the broadest geographic footprint to spread the crop and event risk, increase our economies of scale, and take a disciplined approach to organic expansion. The industry is still under pinned by good demand growth and seaborne trade will grow at a faster rate than consumption itself. Technology does not threaten our handling and processing business as it cannot replace the assets themselves. 

Where is there over-capacity?

In the north of Brazil…in the US Pacific North West…..in the US Gulf….in the Ukraine…on the east coast of Australia. There was only limited overcapacity in Canada on the west coast but with recent investments in the port of Vancouver there will now be more overcapacity for a number of years. 

Not only is there over capacity, but also the existing installed capacity has become a lot more efficient, largely because transport has become more efficient. Trains and trucks are getting bigger, and operators have expanded their terminal input capacity. For example, the railroad in Canada and barge system along the Amazon are increasingly more efficient. Efficiency gains are of course effectively capacity gains.

What is preventing M&A activity in the sector?

A number of things. You would think that pressured margins would encourage acquisitions. The industry has had a difficult two or three years during which potential acquirers have had their own earning issues and were obviously less bold. Things were potentially cheaper but the buyers were more careful. On the other hand, sellers are reluctant because they think the industry is going to get better. It hasn’t yet. Anti-trust and foreign control regulation is also a potential hurdle to some combinations.

Half of Brazil’s cane is used to make ethanol. Do you believe biofuels have a future?

People blow hot and cold on biofuels. Politicians were positive on biofuels 12 years or so ago, and they set up structures to support them: either mandating their use or providing tax advantages, or both. This propelled ethanol production in the US and Brazil, and biodiesel production in Europe.

In 2007/8 and again in 2012, we had periods of high crop prices and people became rightly very concerned about the competition between food and fuel. When you look at the amount of food that gets processed into fuel it clear why this is an issue. We should be very concerned about using food to produce fuel when people don’t have enough food. The other issue is when you look at the carbon footprint of biofuels and consider fertilizer, water and diesel use, you can question whether they are really that good for the environment. That issue hasn’t been completely resolved. This turned the politicians off and the political support was pulled.

However, I think there has been something of a rethink. Food prices have come down and we have surpluses again. When that happens, biofuels can help support prices for farmers. Over 40 percent of US corn production is used for ethanol, and over 50 percent of EU rapeseed is used to produce biodiesel. If you took away that demand, prices would collapse along with farm incomes. 

How involved are you in biofuels?

We have three biodiesel plants in the EU. Margins were low for 3-4 years with static demand and production overcapacity. In the past few years no new capacity has been added, and some capacity has been taken out. Demand has increased a little. Meanwhile, the drought last summer put some plants out of action as they couldn’t get their barges up the rivers. At the same time, the EU blocked SME imports from Argentina and, in some circumstances, PME from Asia. Margins have improved considerably and the business has been good for the past year. 

Biofuels are a good example of optionality in Ag assets. There is an embedded optionality in Ag assets.

So assets are your biggest asset, so to speak!

An asset base is essential today but in addition to their asset portfolios what distinguishes companies is their people, their culture, the way management and employees interact and treat each other—the respect they show for each other. What kind of a company do you want to make it? In the end any company can hire bright people, but it is the steps it takes to build a motivated, hard-working, entrepreneurial, fast acting team that is important for success. People spend the greatest part of their lives at work; they do not do it only for the money. The Glencore culture is a strength I believe, certainly helped in the early days by private ownership. It is something that must be nurtured to ensure that despite growth it is not lost. 

Thank you Chris for your time!

© Commodity Conversations ®

Part One

Good morning Chris, and thank you for taking the time to talk with us. First question: You rowed in the Oxford & Cambridge Boat Race from 1979 to 1981 and are a four-time winner at Henley Royal Regatta. You won the silver medal in the eight at the 1980 Moscow Olympics. What lessons did your rowing career teach you that have been useful to you as a commodity trader?

Sport for me is a microcosm of life, especially business life. As in everything, the more you put into it, the more you get out; the harder you work the better you become. So the things that you need to do to succeed in sport are the same things you need to do to succeed in business: effort, focus, discipline, and dedication. The beauty of sport is there is little politics, if you are fast nobody can deny it. There is no quick fix, it takes years of effort and hard work to do well in sport; the same in business!

When the Canadian Globe and Mail interviewed you in 2016, the journalist wrote that you looked like you “could empty a grain silo in about 10 minutes with a shovel.” How do you keep so fit, and how does it help you bear the pressure of the job?

I probably exercise five times a week, including cycling at the weekends. When I cycle I go at it hard. And in the gym I don’t sit on the rowing machine for 45 minutes. I do interval training, for example five times 1,000 metres. That is not only better for you but is also less boring! Also, I time and record everything, and I wear a heartbeat monitor.

Ivan Glasenberg, the CEO of Glencore, was a champion race-walker for both South Africa and Israel, and runs one hour every morning with a group of senior managers. Is physical fitness actively encouraged at Glencore?

I believe Ivan runs or swims every morning, there is an office swimming group I know because I have tried and failed to keep up with them when I have been in Baar. We used to run together when we were travelling. I think it is part of the culture, although not for everyone. When you are exercising hard you are not thinking about anything. In fact, if I am not suffering I find it less relaxing!

Marc Rich once famously told his wife when they got married that he could spare the family 30 minutes on a Saturday and 45 minutes on a Sunday. How do you manage your work / life balance?

That is absolutely not the case with me. There was one big transaction, the Viterra transaction, which was an exception. It was an intense six or seven month period during which I spent many weekends in Canada. That period aside, I believe I have always been able to balance my family and my work. I virtually never travel on the weekend—I make a point of that. My family is very important to me.

When you were at Cargill you “invented” the model of modern sugar trading, levering large physical positions against futures positions and then making big profits on the futures. That was very innovative, although the model has pretty much run itself to death now. You could have ended up running Cargill. Why did you leave?

I don’t know that I could have ended up running Cargill. I started in sugar which was relatively independent, and a little apart from corporate Cargill. Working in the sugar division of Cargill at that time was a little bit like running your own company. There was no real interference from above, but at the same time the financing and the corporate support were there. It was ideal.

Cargill likes to rotate their senior managers, and in the mid-nineties I was transferred to the grain division in a regional management role. There are a lot of people in Cargill who know something about grain and, good company though Cargill is, there were too many opinions at that time for my liking. Perhaps unreasonably I found it restrictive and missed the trading and so I left, probably more my fault than Cargill’s.    

Didn’t you at one stage trade coffee?

Yes, you’re right, but for only a short period. Every morning we had to taste different grades of coffee, and one day my colleagues played a trick on me, and slipped in two cups of tea. I couldn’t tell the difference!  Let’s say I was not the best coffee taster in the world!

When you first left Cargill you worked for a short while at Phibro?

Yes, in Westport Connecticut with Andy Hall, who incidentally also rowed for Oxford against Cambridge, but a few years before me. I made the easy choice—which probably wasn’t the right choice—to go back to what I knew: to go back to the sugar business in a pure trading role.

When I joined them, Phibro was part of Salomon Smith Barney, but a few months later they were bought by Travellers Group, and then three months after that they merged with Citibank. These were two big bank mergers and commodities didn’t fit their plans. Andy told me I could stay on, but that I would have to keep the business small, and focused entirely on futures and derivatives. I already believed that a pure derivatives trading business was never going to work in sugar. It had to have a physical base with origination, sales and a distribution book. Guessing whether the market was going to go up or down was never going to work, or at least it was never going to work for me.

So you joined Glencore in Rotterdam. You had moved from Geneva to Westport, and after only a few months moved back to Europe. What did your wife think of that?

She was not very happy. My wife is American—she had been excited about going back to the US, and that was one of the reasons why I accepted the position with Phibro. I remember promising her that this would be our base and this was going to be our life. We bought a nice house in Connecticut, one of those old colonial houses. Our daughter was born there.

But eight months later we talked it over, and both realised that the opportunity with Glencore was just too good to turn down. She was very supportive. We agreed to give it a go for a couple of years, and that if it didn’t work out we would come back to Connecticut. That was 21 years ago. We moved to The Hague. She found it tough for a few years, but stuck with it. The Dutch are easy to get on with, and it is a lovely place to live—great for kids. We love it.

I joined Glencore in 1998 as number two with geographical responsibilities for South America, the FSU and Africa, and became head of Agriculture in 2002.

In 2011 your cotton-trading department lost $300 million, wiping out your total profits of that year. Would you like to briefly explain what happened, and what you learned from it?

We had a large long position in non-US physical cotton hedged in the US futures market. It was a basis, or premium, position—not an outright position—so we believed our risks were somewhat limited. The physical market was tight at that time—both in the US and globally. Our position expressed the view that world cotton was undervalued compared to US cotton.

One company decided to take delivery of the US cotton futures. They had specifically sold US cotton to their customers and wanted US cotton to cover their sales. The problem was that they wanted to take delivery of more US cotton than was physically available for delivery. Rather than swap US cotton for other cheaper origins, which was the economic thing to do in my view, they maintained their long position in US futures and the market went sky high. Non US origins also went up in price, but to nothing like the same extent. A huge differential opened up between US cotton and non-US cotton.

You were head of Glencore Ag at that time, so the problem ended up on your plate?

I was responsible for setting up the cotton desk so it more than landed on my plate. It was my plate. It was clearly my responsibility. We had hired a team from outside, because we didn’t have a cotton business. Clearly with hindsight we should have looked to have developed a cotton team from within, supplemented with outside expertise. Glencore in Switzerland was not happy of course but Ivan supported me in a way that I never forgot. 

How important is corporate culture, and if it is important does it make it hard for mergers to work in the trading business?

Corporate culture is critical and that is one reason why it is challenging to acquire trading businesses. Acquiring assets—a logistics business and supply chain management—is easier. There is also the issue that unless you are willing to double the risk—double the size of the VAR—then one plus one doesn’t necessarily equal two. We also do not feel we need to buy trading expertise as we already have it.

© Commodity Conversations ®

The programme for the FT Commodities Summit in Lausanne this year included a breakfast panel on Women in Commodities. Just holding the panel proved rather controversial; some conference attendees argued that the FT should have made more of an effort to include women on all the panels, and not have a separate one for them.

The summit organizers told me that they had tried hard to do just that, but were sadly unable to find industry leaders who were female. Instead, panel after panel at the conference consisted of old white men in blue suits, white shirts and the, apparently obligatory, Hermes tie. (I mean no disrespect; I am white and just as old, and was for the occasion dressed in exactly the same way!) The failure to find more women wasn’t the FT’s fault; it is just that the top echelons of the industry are currently almost 100 percent male.

Another criticism that I heard voiced at the event was that the women’s panel was 100 percent female. Indeed one of the panel participants told me afterwards that she had been surprised that, when she had looked out over the audience, she had seen that it was almost entirely male. She said that it had taken her a while to realize that that was because many of the women at the event were at that moment on the stage!

She also expressed her disappointment that the panel was entirely female. “It is no good just us women talking together,” she told me afterwards. “What we need is for a change of attitude among the men in the industry…for men to realize their unconscious biases, and accept the contribution that women can make to the sector.”

The panel, sponsored by the metals-trading Gerald Group, got off to an awkward start. In opening remarks, the company’s (female) COO and Board Member made a brave effort to convince the audience that Gerard actively sought out and promoted women. No sooner had she sat down than the FT journalist reminded her that Gerard had been criticised last year for holding their annual Metals Week party at the Playboy Club, complete with Playmates in low-cut, black satin leotards and fluffy tails. All the COO could do to justify that decision was to tell the journalist that it hadn’t bothered her and, in any case, it was “a convenient location.”

This type of thing highlights the sector’s (sometimes justified) sexist and macho image. Quite simply, there are few women currently in commodities because few women wanted to be in commodities. The sector’s image often puts women off from wanting to join in the first place. Much therefore needs to be done first to improve behaviour, and then second, to get the message across that commodity trading is no longer the macho sexist world that it once was. I hope this website is doing just a little bit to help in that cause.

There was some debate on the panel as to whether companies should positively discriminate in favour of women; some thought they should, others not. There are good arguments on both sides, but surely it is in the interest of every company to have more women on board. As every recruiter knows, hiring the right person is not just, or even necessarily, a question of academic qualifications and experience. When you recruit someone you are looking for the best person to fit in with, or lead, a team. And if your team is predominately male, then the best person may well be female.

There was also some discussion over eliminating unconscious bias among recruiters. A panellist from the mining sector explained how her company trains managers to be aware of their unconscious biases regarding gender, race and religion.

However, one panellist made the moot point that unconscious biases exist not just in our sector, but also across the board. She gave the example of journalists who always ask senior female executives about their children, and how they manage their work life balance. They never pose that question to a senior male executive. (Funnily enough, I had asked Chris Mahoney from Glencore that very question the previous day! I will be posting his interview next week!)

The panellist from the mining sector did make another key point: the mining industry is changing. She highlighted that one of her company’s mines in South Australia is now managed from Perth, making it easier to attract women. In any case, she added, the mining sector is replacing muscles with machines, making it easier for women to be competitive within the sector.

But it is not just mining that is changing. Trading is also changing with more money now earned from supply chain management, logistics, and innovation than from outright trading. This change will, I believe, inevitably lead to more women seeking to join the sector.

But even when more women are attracted to sector, women need to do more to help themselves to advance within an extremely competitive environment. One panellist told me afterwards that women tend to believe that all they need to do to advance in their careers is to work hard and do a good job. After all, their hard work at school was rewarded by good grades in the final exams. Unfortunately, this is not enough in the world of business. As Patricia Manso pointed out recently, hard networking and self-promotion are essential in any career.

So in conclusion, the commodity trading industry is changing and in so doing so will naturally attract more women. Even so, the sector must continue to improve both its behaviour and its image. It also has to mentor male managers to recognise their unconscious biases. And once they are in the sector, women need to do more to get their contribution noticed.

Unfortunately, it may take a generation for there to be an equal number of men and women on the stage at a future FT Commodities Summit. I may not be around to see it, but it will happen.