
After a 30-year career at the world’s largest trading companies, including Cargill, Bunge, Wilmar and Engelhart, Philip has set up Rhino, a consultancy, to share his market experience and expertise with producers, consumers and hedge funds. For my first question, I asked him how the four trading houses he had worked for differed.
Bunge and Cargill were culturally aligned and relied heavily on communication across different parts of the business. They consistently focused on internal analytics, believing that their market edge would come from proprietary research and trading acumen.
Wilmar was more of a typical Asian trading house, with dominant leaders centralising much of the decision-making. Again, we relied heavily on physicals and fundamentals when making our trading decisions.
When I joined in 2021, Engelhart had already exited its physical businesses. We operated as a fund, relying on a combination of fundamental and quantitative analysis. We probably spent half our time on fundamentals and analytics, and the other half on interpreting data and trading from a more ‘quantamental’ perspective.
Cargill has exited physical sugar trading and now trades only derivatives. Was it a good decision?
When I was at Cargill through 2012, it was a dominant player in the industry, with a very large physical presence and assets—more at destination than at origin. The model changed after 2012. It still traded physicals but sold its assets, so it no longer had those to trade around. The company became much leaner, with a smaller footprint and lower costs.
Whether that was good or bad is difficult to judge. In today’s sugar market, it is hard to be anything other than a lean structure trading primarily in futures, or a relatively large structure with a presence across many physical markets and some assets. Once Cargill decided to step away from assets, it was probably right for them to step back from physical trading as well.
Can you trade physical sugar without assets?
You can trade physicals without assets, but you then become more of a price taker, making it harder to find leverage in the market.
If you have assets—particularly refinery assets and storage—you can use them to build programmes in either raws or whites. You can adjust your pace, use storage flexibility, and trade more aggressively around deliveries and expiries.
Assets give you the opportunity to build leverage around futures expiries. You can still trade physicals without assets, but your position in the delivery game is weaker. You rely on third parties to build destination books and to participate in the futures market.
In my experience, assets are more valuable at destination than at origin for a trading book. At origin, logistics pressures often make it difficult to build flexibility and optionality into those assets. Elevation can become a burden when you are obliged to run at a set pace each month.
You may have some built-in flexibility, but take-or-pay commitments can require you to run elevation whether or not you have a destination for the sugar.
Tell me about Rhino. First, where does the name come from?
It is a play on my surname and was my nickname, dating back to when I worked in Australia. We have bulls, bears and, occasionally, buffaloes—thanks to you. So I thought: why not add a rhino to the mix?
We are an information and consulting firm. We support clients by providing a trading framework and actionable insights across the global sugar market, particularly white sugar.
There is a huge amount of information in the market today, but more information does not always make hedging and pricing decisions easier. We help our clients filter the noise, explain what the information means, identify the implications, and create a simplified framework for decision-making.
We aim to help clients understand the risk of the market moving against them, the potential opportunities available to them, and the main drivers of price risk.
How has the market changed since you started in sugar 30 years ago?
When I started as a futures trader at Cargill, volumes were relatively low, and participants were mainly commercial. Our edge came from receiving information on key origins and destinations before other market participants, thanks to our local operations and global presence. We did not have social media or the internet to relay information as they do today.
Funds existed, but they were relatively small and predictable. They would buy or sell over two or three days; once they were done, they were finished. Today, the market’s composition has changed entirely. Speculators are much larger.
Fundamentals remain an important input and continue to shape the market’s medium- to long-term direction. However, speculative flows often dwarf commercial flows in the short term. Sugar can become correlated with crude oil or energy one week, and with currencies or other soft commodities the next. Correlations come and go with no logic or foresight. Politics and global macro developments can also shape short-term movements.
A commodity trader needs to understand and anticipate how macroeconomic factors may influence the market. That means traders probably hold positions for shorter periods and take fewer highly leveraged bets than before.
As the market adage goes, “Markets can remain irrational longer than you can stay solvent.”
Who are these speculators?
Let’s start with the CTAs, the Commodity Trading Advisors. They are much more important than they used to be, with assets under management about 10 times what they were 20 years ago.
There are two broad types of CTAs: discretionary and systematic. Discretionary CTAs are where people understand market fundamentals and trade accordingly. These are closer to the traditional CTAs of old.
Almost all growth over the past 20 years has come from systematic CTAs. Around 85% of CTA assets under management today are systematic. These firms employ people who build backward-looking models using tools such as moving averages and breakout levels to determine when to buy or sell.
Essentially, their models buy when markets appear to be strengthening—for example, when shorter-term averages cross longer-term averages—and sell when the opposite occurs. As signals strengthen, they scale into positions.
These funds trade across perhaps 25 or 30 commodities simultaneously. They trade without emotion. They do not necessarily know or care about the underlying fundamentals; their models tell them whether to buy or sell, and orders may be executed automatically.
They can lose money in half of their markets and still be successful if their gains in the other half are larger. They tend to make good money in trending markets and get chopped around in range-bound markets. Historically, gains in trends have often outweighed losses in range-bound markets.
To what extent are commodity markets now being traded by computers?
High-frequency trading firms can account for a significant share of daily volume—well over half in some cases.
CTAs are harder to measure, but estimates suggest that a fully deployed CTA position in sugar may be around 50,000 to 60,000 lots. If CTAs move from an extended short position to long, or vice versa, that could mean more than 100,000 lots of potential buying or selling over several days.
What about index funds—the traditional long-only ‘whales’? Are they still relevant?
They are less interesting and less relevant than CTAs, simply because they tend to be large, long and static.
There is some adjustment during the year, particularly at year-end when indices rebalance across commodities. There is also activity around the roll at futures expiry, creating liquidity and perhaps opportunities for the trade to scalp. However, their influence is probably much lower than that of CTAs, as they simply go long and sit there. Their position moves up and down somewhat, but they do not enter and exit frequently.
What about the traditional trade houses?
They still matter and retain an edge because they understand physical markets and convergence games around expiry in ways that indices, black boxes and high-frequency traders do not. However, traders are human and trade emotionally. The key for a trade house is to understand where, when and how to play.
Trade houses have at times been beaten up by getting large flat-price moves wrong when black boxes have engaged strongly in one direction. That may not be the game they should play hardest. They need to pick and choose their battles.
What is the hardest part of being a physical sugar trader?
Excluding the act of buying and selling itself, the toughest situation is taking a large position and finding that you are wrong because circumstances, crops or supply-and-demand balances have shifted.
In futures, if your position is appropriate for market liquidity, you can usually enter and exit relatively easily. In physicals, exit liquidity can be very difficult to find. The biggest challenge for physical traders is when they want to turn a position because they see values turning against them is finding exit liquidity.
Can you make money trading physical sugar without taking a position?
It is challenging to achieve a back-to-back margin on raw sugar. You cannot easily buy sugar in Brazil and sell it to a refiner in China or the Middle East for a meaningful back-to-back profit.
In whites, pockets of opportunity remain. Traders with strong destination relationships can create value. Some companies excel in containers, running relatively small positions while generating consistent margins.
On raws, you need to build positions. Your edge lies in combining a futures view with cash.
Are regional players taking market share from traditional trade houses?
On whites, yes, we have seen regional or specialised players gain market share by building relationships and doing it well.
Raw sugar still appears to be dominated by global companies with access to large destination entities.
Are state-owned companies becoming more involved in sugar trading, as they have in grain markets?
Not really. If anything, sugar has moved away from state participation and more towards private companies.
Sugar consumption is stagnant, while sugarcane ethanol faces growing competition from other feedstocks. How are producers responding?
It is a difficult environment; producers are suffering. Sugar prices have consistently been below production costs across most origins.
Brazilian mills enjoyed strong margins, returns and free cash flow two or three years ago. Today, cash flows are negative. Over the cycle, it can still be a positive-cash-flow business. The challenge is ensuring that when times are good, companies reduce debt rather than simply reinvesting all cash flow in expansion. Otherwise, they can struggle with debt when the cycle turns down.
Brazil used to be the main regulator: when sugar prices were low, the cane mix would shift significantly towards ethanol. But Brazilian corn ethanol has expanded rapidly and is now displacing the equivalent of perhaps 15–16 million tonnes of sugar in ethanol terms. That trend is likely to continue.
Is there a future for EU sugar producers?
Absolutely. Europe is a huge market.
If Europe were a single producer, it would likely produce almost enough sugar to meet domestic demand—but not quite enough. That would force imports and allow domestic prices to trade at import parity, perhaps 750–800 euros per tonne at current levels.
The question is whether exports should be its focus. Crop planning is difficult because yields are uncertain, and producers need sufficient acreage to guarantee domestic supply. Over time, Europe may reduce production slightly and see domestic prices remain consistently higher.
Is the sugar market fundamentally in structural surplus, with occasional weather-related shortages?
On a production-and-consumption basis, the answer is probably ‘no’.
However, the answer may be yes on a trade-flow basis, as stocks can often be exported relatively easily once prices rise. For example, during the recent rally, Egypt destocked significantly, China released sugar, and Vietnam sold sugar. This was not necessarily additional production; it was existing stock becoming available to the trade.
When there is a slight tightness on a production-consumption basis and prices rally, surplus stocks from many countries can be exported.
The ratoon nature of cane also matters. When there is a true deficit, and prices rise enough to incentivise more production—as in 2022—we see acreage expansion, increased fertiliser use and a relatively quick supply response. We saw something like a 15 million-tonne increase in production over a couple of years, which is significant.
Once that expansion occurs, sugar moves from origin to destination and is stored somewhere. It can then re-emerge when prices rise during a short-term production-consumption deficit.
So the market is not structurally in surplus on a production-consumption basis. But it often holds enough stocks that, from a trade-flow perspective, it is rarely truly short. Prices can draw that sugar out.
What does the future hold for the sugar market?
Some of the major trends over the past five to 10 years are likely to continue.
First, sugar consumption is unlikely to grow anywhere near as fast as it once did. We see this in Europe, the United States and other developed markets. We also see the impact of new weight-loss drugs, with people cutting back on carbohydrates.
Historically, the industry needed to increase production consistently, perhaps by 7–8 million tonnes every five years, just to keep pace with consumption. That may no longer be necessary.
Second, climate change has made the weather more volatile and less predictable. Heat, drought, erratic rainfall, El Niño and other weather effects can wreak havoc with production.
Third, deglobalisation may lead to more regionalised world trade. Supply-chain disruptions—such as a closure of the Strait of Hormuz—show how much food moves through strategically important regions. Countries may begin to hold mandated stocks of key foodstuffs and strategic grains. They may also seek to develop more regional supply chains, particularly for white sugar.
Brazil and Thailand may remain dominant origins for raws, while whites may increasingly flow through regional destination refineries.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the world has generally pursued deliberate destocking at destination because supply chains appeared resilient. Recent geopolitical events may change that. The move toward greater destination stocks and more regional supply chains could be a significant structural shift. Fourth, sugarcane should continue to lose market share to corn in ethanol production.
What would you say to a young graduate considering a career in physical sugar trading: Great idea, or are you mad?
This is not the best time to be a sugar trader, as margins and value creation are under pressure everywhere. But that is cyclical.
There will be moments again when physical trading offers more value and interesting convergence plays in raws and whites. Sugar remains a great commodity market. It is liquid, based on an FOB contract that is relatively easy to understand, and has multiple deliveries throughout the year.
I would encourage a young person to enter the sugar market. But I would also say: find a company with good teachers and mentors who can pass on their experience. Picking the right company and individuals is important.
Thank you, Philip, for your time and input.
©CommodityConversations®2026
The second edition of my book, The Sugar Casino, will be published in September.















